The United States must develop a clear strategy detailing its policy objectives in the Middle East in general and towards Iran in particular. So far this has proven elusive for the Trump administration. A clear, well-articulated policy should be understood by partners and competitors alike, in the Middle East and globally, especially Russia and China who have significant interests in the Middle East that are not aligned with those of Washington.

At the top of the long list of priorities, the United States needs to develop a coherent and strategically realistic policy toward Iran moving beyond bellicosity and in the direction of increased influence, practicality, and impact. On the simplest level, Washington cannot persuade the people of Iran that it is in sympathy with their goals while simultaneously appearing to denigrate Islam, belittling Iranian culture, and denying Iran’s citizens visas to travel to the United States. 

It is unclear what Washington expects from the government of the Islamic Republic as well as U.S. strategic and policy objectives. Make no mistake, the current Iranian regime warrants condemnation for its treatment of its own citizens, its destructive regional activities in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, and other well-catalogued deviations from generally accepted international norms. The question is what can and should the United States do to make things better?

Although the demonstrations in Iran may appear to have ended for the moment, it is clear there are simmering tensions in Iran that will persist. This is not over.

Recent demonstrations in Iran provided valuable insight into the mood of the Iranian people and the lack of respect and popularity the Iranian people have toward their own government. As we have long known, the Iranian population is unhappy and restless. The most recent round of demonstrations focused on grievances related to the economic mismanagement of the country by a government that many Iranians believe is more committed to expending valuable national resources on regional military and political adventures rather than directly addressing the needs of the Iranian people. An unfolding water scarcity crisis in Iran, corruption in financial institutions on a massive scale, more recent protests by women’s groups, and brutal and bumbling responses by Tehran all contribute to widespread discontent. Although the demonstrations may appear to have ended for the moment, it is clear there are simmering tensions in Iran that will persist. This is not over.

The challenge for the United States and its partners is to find a way to constructively nudge this country of 83 million people back into the global community. The Iranian people must believe that their aspirations are recognized and supported internationally, while not politicizing support in a way that suggests Iranians are in league with a strident and ideological Washington in search of regime overthrow. At this sensitive moment, the United States can easily make things worse rather than better if it is clumsy and heavy handed in its approach to Iran. 

Although it is generally recognized that the Iran nuclear deal is flawed, it cannot be forgotten that it was intended by its architects to be a narrow agreement on a single set of issues, not an omnibus agreement meant to deal with all aspects of objectionable Iranian foreign policy behavior. Put simply, the nuclear deal is limited to dealing with Iran’s nuclear program and nothing more. Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Abbas Araqchi, illustrated this point recently when he said that Iran would be willing to discuss other issues if the United States first ensures the success of the nuclear deal.

Despite its flaws, the nuclear deal still provides external powers the ability to interact with Iran.

Iran should be considered in the context of additional Middle East policy challenges confronting Washington, which include establishing a sensible U.S. position on the Qatar blockade that reflects American interests and those of U.S. allies on both sides of the blockade; formulating meaningful regional policies since announcing the move of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem; being attentive to emerging challenges in Egypt; developing long-term, attainable objectives in Afghanistan; dealing more effectively with Turkey in a number of spheres; and articulating U.S. policy objectives in Syria and Iraq.

Lately Iran has been adroit in taking advantage of political developments favoring its interests throughout the region. For example, the blockade of Qatar, implicitly sanctioned by the United States, opened the door for Iran to play Qatar’s savior. Following the blockade, Iran eagerly stepped in by allowing over-flight rights to Qatar Air, currently barred from flying over neighboring Arab states, which increased the export of agricultural and other commodities to Qatar that it once procured from fellow Arab neighbors. With the decline of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran as well Turkey now have access to the Arabian Peninsula traditionally denied them. No one should be surprised that Iran took advantage of questionable geopolitical decisions made by others.

Despite its flaws, the nuclear deal still provides external powers the ability to interact with Iran. Torpedoing the nuclear deal as threatened by the Trump administration closes a door which, left ajar, gives the possibility of making progress on other issues. If President Trump pulls the United States out of the deal, we can assume that our erstwhile partners will stay the course without Washington, and America will yet again be left of the sidelines ceding leadership roles to others and forfeiting the benefits.

Until the United States has a genuine set of clear policy expectations for Iran as well as for the rest of the Middle East, it will continue to flail as it has for the past year.

What we know with some certainty is that other senior U.S. officials including Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, while recognizing the well-known flaws in the nuclear deal, oppose abandonment of it by the United States. Whether the President listens to his expert advisors or chooses to ignore them is another story. Until the United States has a genuine set of clear policy expectations for Iran as well as for the rest of the Middle East, it will continue to flail as it has for the past year.

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Dr. Jerrold D. Green is the president and CEO of the Pacific Council on International Policy.