Two weeks ago, Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in stepped hand-in-hand over the concrete slabs dividing North and South Korea, sparking excitement at the prospect of a peaceful end to the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula. On Tuesday morning, President Trump made that goal dramatically more difficult. While robust engagement with Pyongyang continues to be our best hope for preventing an armed conflict and potentially hundreds of thousands of deaths, it appears increasingly likely that the White House is completely unprepared for this moment.

Reaching an agreement with Pyongyang was always going to be difficult. In abandoning the Iran nuclear deal and pursuing a policy aimed at "break[ing] the regime," despite Tehran holding up its end of the bargain, the White House has sent a signal to North Korea that the United States cannot be trusted to negotiate in good faith. This will make securing meaningful concessions far less likely and it is already alienating many of our key allies. The White House has forgotten a cardinal rule of national security: when you’re already confronting a nuclear crisis, it’s generally unwise to provoke a second.

Just as the White House was preparing to abandon nuclear diplomacy with Iran, President Trump boasted about the April 27 Inter-Korean Summit Declaration that defined a "common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula." Unfortunately, the Trump administration is establishing unrealistic expectations and potentially setting talks up for failure before they even get off the ground.

While many in the United States read "complete denuclearization" to mean North Korea will hand over its nuclear weapons and open up its nuclear sites to inspections, the phrase means something very different to North Korean negotiators.

While many in the United States read "complete denuclearization" to mean North Korea will hand over its nuclear weapons and open up its nuclear sites to inspections, the phrase means something very different to North Korean negotiators. For Pyongyang, it suggests an end to U.S. security guarantees to Japan and South Korea that have underwritten regional security since the end of World War II.

Furthermore, when the two Koreas pledge to formally end the Korean War, Pyongyang is focused on one thing: removing the roughly 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. Pyongyang’s claim that it will abandon its nuclear weapons if the United States ensures non-aggression should be treated with skepticism, as the United States has repeatedly affirmed that it "has no intention to attack or invade" North Korea. Pyongyang is looking for something far more concrete.

The big question is what, if anything, is different about the current moment. For one, we are dealing with different leadership in both Pyongyang and Washington. While Kim had technically already assumed power before the last agreement fell apart in March 2012, he was mere months into his rule, and it is unclear how firmly he held the reigns of the North Korean state at that time. In the months that followed, Kim undertook a series of brutally violent purges removing competing sources of power, famously including his uncle Jang Song-thaek.

President Trump has a reputation as a leader who frequently changes his mind. Kim is relatively new to international diplomacy. If the two leaders fail to find common ground, there is no clear Plan B.

Kim Jong-un is now coming to the table with a much stronger hand than his father. Pyongyang views its nuclear program as the ultimate guarantor of regime survival. They look to countries like Iraq, Libya, and Syria as cautionary tales and argue that, much as the United States learned to live with a nuclear India and Pakistan, it will learn to live with a nuclear North Korea. Most importantly, they have now carried out six nuclear tests and demonstrated a missile capable of reaching the United States (though this should not be confused with the ability to actually deliver a nuclear weapon to the United States, which will still take more time).

President Trump is also taking a very different approach to North Korea than his predecessors. Eager to cement a legacy-defining deal, the president has decided to take a high-stakes personal role in negotiations early on. This is backed by tightened sanctions and indications China is willing to use at least a few economic levers to bring Pyongyang to the table. There are real risks to this approach. President Trump has a reputation as a leader who can be unpredictable and who frequently changes his mind. Kim is also relatively new to international diplomacy and it remains to be seen how he will handle himself at the negotiating table. If the two leaders fail to find common ground, there is no clear Plan B.

There are also those working in the Trump administration who are actively seeking to undermine negotiations. Newly appointed National Security Advisor John Bolton is a notorious diplomacy skeptic, arguing for a pre-emptive strike on North Korea in The Wall Street Journal just two months ago. Last week, Bolton casually suggested that the White House was pursuing the "Libya model" in its approach to negotiations. This was no accident. North Korean negotiators often point out that less than a decade after Libya transferred its nuclear equipment to the United States, a mob brutally killed Col. Muammar Qaddafi with U.S. air support. Bolton is no fool; he’s betting against the house.

If President Trump approaches the table under the illusion that his blustery tweets have left Kim Jong-un rattled and eager to make concessions, negotiations are likely to end in disaster.

The Trump administration should be applauded for its willingness to engage with North Korea, but it is vital that they go into these negotiations with eyes open. Pyongyang has a long history of violating its international commitments and Kim’s government continues to be one of the world’s worst violators of human rights. These facts cannot be papered over by optimism. Furthermore, Pyongyang has proven itself skillful at extracting economic concessions in exchange for vague unenforceable promises.

If President Trump approaches the table under the illusion that his blustery tweets have left Kim Jong-un rattled and eager to make concessions, negotiations are likely to end in disaster. Instead, we must focus on obtaining commitments that are clearly defined and realistically verifiable. Unlike Iran, North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons and it won’t give them up lightly. If we pretend otherwise, we may soon find ourselves back at square one or somewhere far worse.

_______________________

Thomas Zimmerman is the chief officer for events and trips at the Pacific Council.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Pacific Council.