The West typically thinks of ISIL as a sophisticated mass media machine with its high-quality magazines and videos glorifying the mission of the Islamic State, and its impressive social media prowess convincing people from all over the world to join its ranks—at home or abroad. But it often seems like the United States is playing catch up to fight back. So often, the United States focuses on reactionary measures to global issues, finding solutions only when faced with a problem.

How did ISIL grow early on? Are there lessons the West can learn from ISIL's rapid growth in order to prevent such organizations from proliferating in the future? There is indeed a common link between development, governance, and terrorism.

In fact, at a recent Pacific Council event, Karen Sessions of the Millennium Challenge Corporation said "poverty creates conflict."

The idea of a Caliphate isn’t only a religious aspiration, and it’s not just about violence and control. It’s also about providing a system of governance, consisting of new laws and regulations, of infrastructure support and social services.

While researchers have found a weak link between individual poverty and terrorism, there is a strong case for societal poverty as a breeding ground for terrorism. According to a piece in the Journal of International Affairs, "It is clear that the availability of various social services such as health facilities and education infrastructures, the prevalence of social exclusion and the incidence of various forms of inequality should all be included in this enlarged understanding of poverty."

This is precisely how ISIL began.

The idea of a Caliphate isn’t only a religious aspiration, and it’s not just about violence and control. It’s also about providing a system of governance, consisting of new laws and regulations, of infrastructure support and social services.

In essence, ISIL created a brand new societal structure, according to Security Praxis. "ISIL establishes a bureaucratic machinery through new local rulers (as mayors and local ministers), new police forces, laws with new rights and obligations, taxes, and a new judiciary system based on sharia. Furthermore, the group plans the administration of the territory to the smallest detail. It takes over the electricity offices, installs new power lines, maintains the area’s infrastructures and protects its main resources."

ISIL used a detailed, record-keeping bureaucracy (even suicide bombers had to fill out a form) to stay in power. Under ISIL control, the streets were cleaner. Garbage collection was taken seriously.

In Rukmini Callimachi’s podcast, Caliphate, she touched on this very issue when looking at the growth of the organization.

Callimachi traveled around Iraq speaking to people who spent years living under ISIL. "ISIL was actually addressing some of the long standing grievances they had had with the previous Iraqi government," she said.

Many simple societal needs that hadn’t been met were finally being met. Towns who struggled with only a few hours of electricity a day were now experiencing electricity 24/7 after ISIL sent in a team of electrical engineers. Police officials, unlike the previous Iraqi officials, did not accept bribes in return for police duties.

And according to Callimachi, one of the near universal things people told her was that the streets were cleaner. Garbage collection was taken seriously. The New York Times recently ran two investigative articles examining how ISIL used a detailed, record-keeping bureaucracy (even suicide bombers had to fill out a form) to stay in power.

Key recruitment tactics early on for ISIL included getting the locals onboard, convincing them to join their ranks, and then continuing with the brutality, such as public executions, stonings, shootings, beheadings, crucifixions, and other atrocities.

"It was a functioning society. It was a functioning state. In some ways they usurped or did better than the government they replaced," said Callimachi. They knew "how to mine local grievances and use them to their advantage… It was working. They were growing."

This is the exact strategy the Journal of International Affairs highlighted: "Moreover, by filling this social service void, terrorist groups erode the legitimacy and power of the states in which they operate."

The New York Times also showcased the link between social services and the early growth of ISIL. "The group is offering reliable, if harsh, security; providing jobs in decimated economies; and projecting a rare sense of order in a region overwhelmed by conflict."

This provision was a key recruitment tactic early on for the organization: Get the locals onboard, convince them to join their ranks, and then continue with the brutality, such as public executions, stonings, shootings, beheadings, crucifixions, and other atrocities.

There are many lessons to be learned from the early days of ISIL growth. Public diplomacy investments like education, infrastructure, and healthcare and other basic social services were lacking in Iraq, thus allowing ISIL to fill the void by providing the services themselves.

But as military intervention increased and Mosul and Raqqa fell, the governance ceased. Now, the United States is fighting ISIL on the digital battlefield. But there are still many lessons to be learned from the early days of ISIL growth.

How can the United States and others prevent this from happening every time a regime falls and creates an unstable government structure?

The One Earth Future Foundation researched the need to move away from military solutions toward a more holistic societal peacebuilding approach. "From Iraq to Afghanistan, military capacity-building and investment in military solutions have been used by the United States and others to achieve peacebuilding goals. But military-driven counterinsurgency efforts largely failed in both contexts, giving rise to the ISIL threat today."

This is where public diplomacy investments like education, infrastructure, and healthcare come into play. All of these basic social services were lacking in Iraq, thus allowing ISIL to fill the void by providing the services themselves.

We should not allow terrorist organizations to provide basic social services when the United States and other governments can use public diplomacy to achieve those goals themselves.

Governance researchers argued that "spending more on social development rather than the military helps to address socioeconomic grievances and may ameliorate conditions that lead to internal armed conflict."

The State Department has the capacity to provide additional programs to bring education and literacy programs to millions of children, in addition to contributing to healthcare programs and partnerships for infrastructure support. Yet, the U.S. government spends hundreds of millions more on military spending than it does on diplomacy.

The West can learn from ISIL. The United States should not allow terrorist organizations to provide basic social services when the United States and other governments can use public diplomacy to achieve those goals themselves. It isn’t about frivolous spending; it isn’t about fixing other countries’ problems. It’s about protecting U.S. national security. It’s about creating a new paradigm for counterterrorism that focuses on identification as opposed to reaction.

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Madison Jones is the Pacific Council’s Communications Associate and a recent graduate of the Master’s in Public Diplomacy program at USC Annenberg.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Pacific Council.