Turkey finds itself at a turning point after the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) resounding electoral victory in November. As President Erdoğan consolidates executive power, the country is embroiled in security dilemmas both foreign and domestic, including rising tensions with Russia, a refugee crisis, a renewed conflict with the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), and the continued threat of ISIL.

Dr. Henri J. Barkey is the Director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center. His most recent works include Turkey's Syria Predicament (Survival, 2014) and Iraq, Its Neighbors and the United States, co-edited with Phebe Marr and Scott Lasensky (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011). He served as a member of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff from 1998 to 2000, working primarily on issues related to the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and intelligence.

At the fifth installment of the Edgerton Series on Iran and Turkey, the Pacific Council's Beril Unver spoke with Dr. Barkey about the various regional and international dynamics at play following the AKP's electoral triumph.

The following has been edited and condensed for clarity and length.

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Beril Unver: In your opinion, what is the most pressing global issue that isn’t receiving enough attention?

Dr. Henri Barkey: ISIL is the most important and the most pressing issue right now, but the underlying problems that feed into ISIL aren't receiving enough attention. We’re really only looking at the tip of the iceberg in Syria; underneath that iceberg are failed states and failed educational systems that feed more strength and support into ISIL. Afghanistan, for instance, has an illiteracy rate of 70%. These failed systems cannot address peoples’ needs, especially when it comes to education, and that's going to fuel extremism for decades to come.

BU: Tensions are high between Moscow and Ankara after Turkey downed a Russian jet. Both countries remain steadfast that the other is at fault. Russia responded by imposing economic sanctions, suspended its visa waiver programs and charter flights, and has accused Erdogan of trading with ISIL. Has the relationship between the two countries been irrevocably damaged, or can they rebuild it?

Dr. Barkey: Turkey has backtracked from their earlier position on this. We’ve seen a clear shift from when the Turkish government and newspapers were saying, “We stood our ground and shot it down, and we’ll do it again if necessary.” Erdogan himself came out and said that if Turkey knew it was a Russian plane, it would not have shot it down. So, Turkey is backtracking, but the Russians won’t have any of it. 

BU: Do you think Erdogan miscalculated Putin’s response?

Dr. Barkey: I think it was a huge and terrible miscalculation. I don’t know why he did it. I think [Erdogan] was angered by Russian airstrikes hitting the Turkmen. Russian airplanes were crossing into Turkish airspace, but they weren't threatening Turkey. I think Erdogan wanted to show his strength. He also miscalculated the reaction from the West in the sense that he assumed that in this confrontational mood, with the dislike the West has for Putin, people would rally around him.

What he did not calculate was that the Russians would react by bringing S-400 missiles into Syria. Russia’s sanctions against Turkey are one thing, but the S-400 missiles create huge problems for the United States, NATO, and the coalition strikes against ISIL. Now, every pilot flying into Syria to bomb ISIL has to be wary because these are very potent weapons. I think that there's a lot of anger in NATO and Washington against Erdogan, but they won’t admit it publicly. 

BU: Putin has amassed about 7,000 troops on the border between Turkey and Armenia. Last weekend, a Russian naval ship fired on a Turkish sailing boat. What does it mean for NATO if the scenario does not improve? 

Dr. Barkey: There is an enormous amount of pressure on Turkey from the United States and NATO to not create problems with Russia. NATO wants to curtail this element of risky behavior on the part of the Turks towards Russia. In the meantime, Putin is going to try to humiliate Erdogan as much as he can.

I have a hunch that Putin really thinks that the downing was a planned ambush – that the Turks made a decision to shoot down a Russian plane and were looking for an excuse. In fact, when you look at the trajectory of the plane, the missile hit after it left Turkish territory. The fact that the Russian pilot was shot in the air also plays into Putin’s anger. With Putin and Erdogan, we have two mercurial leaders who are difficult to understand, but they are not going to simply turn off the gas. Both countries need this relationship to continue. At some point I think Putin will say, “Enough is enough.” We just don’t know when that will be.

BU: Do you think Russia’s claim that Erdogan’s son is trading oil with ISIL is true?

Dr. Barkey: There’s no question that ISIL oil is coming into Turkey. Today we found out that there's also huge amounts of cotton making its way into the country from IS held territories. But I doubt it; it’s too risky. It’s not the kind of trade the son of the president would do. It might be true that oil comes to the Turkish border and then ISIL sells it to lots of different traders, who then take it to different places to refine it. But this is just too complicated for one person to manage. 

BU: Erdogan consolidated his power in the November elections. He hailed the victory as a vote for stability. What lies in store for the country in the short and long term?

Dr. Barkey: It’s not stability. Just look at the results of his actions: the Southeast of the country is in flames, Turkey’s most important human rights lawyer is killed, you have problems with the Russians, and now you have a vote to change the Constitution. I don’t think that stability is in store in the long term.

When populists are in power they hollow out institutions like the judiciary, education, and even business. In Turkey, they are jailing journalists left, right, and center, and going after businesses that support opposition movements. The country’s main newspapers have been taken over. I think the hollowing out of institutions doesn't bode well for Turkey in the long run. 

BU: Erdogan plans to put forward two referendums, one on a new constitution and the other to establish a presidential system. Do you think that the AKP’s majority will allow this to happen, or will those initiatives be blocked?

Dr. Barkey: I don’t know what Erdogan is trying to accomplish by splitting those two. What we do know with Erdogan is that there is always some sort of political calculation. The guy is smart; he is smarter than all of the opposition members put together.

The devil is in the details. The constitutional problem – forget about the presidential system – is going to be a very difficult one to resolve. Identity will be at the heart of the debate. The Turkish constitution says that everybody is a Turk; it defines citizenship on an ethic basis. The Kurds are obviously going to disagree with that. So, in this day and age, do you resolve the issue by bulldozing over the Kurdish opposition? I doubt it. 

Just look at the results of [Erdogan's] actions: the Southeast of the country is in flames, Turkey’s most important human rights lawyer is killed, you have problems with the Russians, and now you have a vote to change the Constitution.

It will be interesting to see how CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or the Republican People’s Party) reacts, because it may very well split over this. Within the party you have people who are either very Atatürkist (Kemalist) – who still believe that Kurds don’t exist – or those who are much more liberal and have evolved over the years. You also have to consider the MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi or Nationalist Movement Party), who will go against any concessions to the Kurds. 

BU: The constitution rests on being a secular democratic republic. Is that still going to be a core component of a new constitution if the AK party gets their way?

Dr. Barkey: I would argue that the Turkish constitution was never democratic. The one exception might have been the 1961 constitution. The current constitution was written by the military. Even the 1924 constitution was never democratic. 

BU: What about secularism?

Dr. Barkey: We have to be careful on what we mean by secularism. The United States is secular. You can be anything you want to here. We have separated church and state. You can be elected to any level of public office in the United States regardless of your beliefs. That’s not how it is in Turkey. 

BU: Is Turkish secularism closer to that of France? 

Dr. Barkey: Even the French system is more secular and tolerant than the Turkish system. In 2007 there was a huge crisis in Turkey where the military almost intervened to stop someone from becoming president because his wife wore a headscarf.

BU: Do you think there will be more of a religious component in the constitution?

Dr. Barkey: I think the temptation will always be there. Turkey can have a genuinely secular constitution like the United States, but Erdogan will be able to infuse the system with religiosity through executive power and the hollowing out of institutions. And nobody will be able to go to the Supreme Court and say anything about it, because Erdogan will be in control of the judiciary, too.

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Beril Unver is the Senior Programs Officer at the Pacific Council on International Policy.